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Abstract
This paper estimates models of social interactions within residential neighborhoods using data
on neighborhood clusters for standard metropolitan areas in the United States from the American
Housing Survey for 1985 and 1989. It examines eﬀects of social interactions in the form of reaction
functions for homeowners’ valuation of their properties at the level of the immediate residential
neighborhood, with neighborhoods consisting of a randomly chosen dwelling unit and about ten
nearest neighbors.
The paper identiﬁes the eﬀect of endogenous social interactions to be signiﬁcant and large,
ranging from 0.587 to 0.770, and much more important then the dynamic (autoregressive) structure
of the model when both variables are present and both are signiﬁcant. The interactive regressions
that it reports improve upon commonly used hedonic regressions as well. The paper provides
empirical support for the notion, common in the real estate world, of the importance of neighboring
properties in property valuations.
JEL classiﬁcation codes: R21, C39
Keywords: Neighborhood eﬀects, housing, social interactions, property valuations.
Suggested Running Head: Interactive Property Valuations.
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Housing is a major component both of the consumption bundle and of personal wealth and the
single most important component of the tax base of primarily residential communities.2 A fair
amount of research has addressed the way in which individuals accumulate wealth. However, past
research has not considered in depth either the spatial aspects of the process nor its interaction
with neighborhood change. These two are of course interdependent. The value of a particular house
may go up because of capital gains due to proximity to other valuable property or other types of
desirable developments in its vicinity. A full understanding of the microeconomic underpinnings of
the determinants of the market value of housing ( and thus of residential capital ) will likely beneﬁt
from careful attention to the dynamics of interaction within residential neighborhoods. Residential
capital is important: in 1991, at 7,889 billion dollars was nearly three times the 2,688 billion dollars
of total assets of U.S. manufacturing corporations. 3
This paper estimates models of social interactions within residential neighborhoods using data
on neighborhood clusters for standard metropolitan areas in the United States from the American
Housing Survey for 1985 and 1989. It examines eﬀects of social interactions in the form of reaction
functions for homeowners’ valuation of their properties at the immediate residential neighborhood
level, with neighborhoods consisting of a dwelling unit and about ten nearest neighbors. The paper
identiﬁes the eﬀect of endogenous social interactions to be signiﬁcant and large, ranging from 0.587
to 0.770, and much more important then the dynamic (autoregressive) structure of the model when
both variables are present and both are signiﬁcant. The interactive regressions that it reports
improve upon commonly used hedonic regressions as well. It thus provides empirical support for
the notion, common in the real estate world, of the importance of neighboring properties in property
valuations using a novel but natural empirical setting.
The paper relies on data from the American Housing Survey (AHS) (U.S. Bureau of the Census
[51]), which are collected from a panel of dwelling units and their current occupants. It makes use
of a little known feature of the survey: for roughly one out of a hundred of dwelling units sampled,
2Economists have shown interest in the phenomenon of the formation of jurisdictions, especially as reﬂected in
the Tiebout model [Tiebout [50] ]. Benabou [3] and Durlauf [14] have reconsidered the fundamental underpinnings
of this model with special emphasis to inequality. Lack of empirical attention to key ideas underpinning Tiebout’s
theory would have been astonishing were it not for a recent revival of interest recently; see Hoyt and Rosenthal [26].
3Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States [52]), T. 1213 and 866. See also, T. 745.
1up to ten of their nearest neighboring units are also sampled. The literal notion of a residential
neighborhood may be central to a variety of social interactions. A plethora of phenomena, such as
individuals’ attitudes towards race, income inequality, crime and ethnicity factors are both causes
and eﬀects of the composition of individuals’ immediate physical and human environment. 4
I examine empirically the extent in which individuals’ valuations of their own properties depend
upon those of their neighbors. I distinguish between the impact of characteristics of neighboring
dwelling units and of characteristics of their occupants from those of one’s neighbors’ valuations.
When neighborhood-average property values are included as regressors as well, the latter emerge
as a more important determinant than own lagged values. This result suggests, as we shall see,
that endogenous social eﬀects are present. It could mean that exogenous changes which aﬀect
neighborhood-average magnitudes, as do some policy-based interventions, are likely to have nu-
merically large eﬀects. The ﬁndings pertaining to the speciﬁc ways in which neighborhood-average
magnitudes matter is robust to various changes in the speciﬁcation. These results are novel in the
context of social interactions literature as well.
Most of the research to date that employs contextual eﬀects has used geographic detail which
is no smaller than census tracts. A fair amount of research uses data for Metropolitan Statistical
Areas (MSAs, for short), which is a much larger geographical unit. Both census tracts and MSAs
are arguably too large for studying phenomena of the sort that are emphasized in this paper, like
neighborhood interactions. Data on individual dwelling units, their occupants and their immediate
neighbors allow us a glimpse at the workings of many processes which are likely to be averaged out
at higher levels of aggregation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the literature on urban
neighborhood interactions. Section 3 discusses the data and Section 4 develops econometric models
for estimating the behavioral model in the presence of neighborhood interactions. Section 5 presents
our empirical results and section 6 concludes.
4Recent research has provided theoretical foundations for an understanding of the emergence of a variety of
economic institutions from local interactions; see Durlauf [15]. Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman [22] examine
social-interactions based explanations of the incidence of crime. Gladwell [21] highlights an epidemic theory of crime
explanation of the recent decrease in crime.
22 The Literature on Urban Neighborhood Interactions
Neighborhood interactions have attracted relatively little attention. The notion of a neighborhood
involves not only spatial proximity but also “a district [ ... ] esp. considered in reference to the
character or circumstances of its inhabitants; a small but relatively self-contained sector of a larger
urban area” [The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary [49], p. 1901]. A pioneering piece by
Pollak [41] emphasizes the empirical implications of the assumption that preferences of individual
members of a group are interdependent, though not necessarily in a neighborhood context, the more
recent literature has invoked Nash equilibrium of strategic interactions. Strange [48], for example,
examines the role of distance and negative feedback in neighborhood eﬀects using an interactive
neighborhoods model where spillovers occur because individuals are aﬀected by the densities of
neighboring areas. Binder and Pesaran [4] adapts a linear-quadratic version of Pollak’s model for
the presence of social interactions and show that under certain conditions the model’s predictions
imply equivalence with the case of self-centered individuals.
Within the urban economics literature, the contribution of neighborhood interactions to the
evolution of residential patterns and neighborhood characteristics has received much less attention
than the role of local public goods. Of course, a neighborhood may evolve around a local public
good. Ellickson [16] provides an explicit model of neighborhood formation, in which individuals
care about nonhousing consumption and neighborhood quality, measured as the average housing
consumption in each neighborhood. Ellickson assumes initial economies of scale, which are ex-
hausted after some minimum neighborhood size. Ellickson contrasts cooperative behavior, where
neighborhood quality is treated as a (local) public good and the outcome is the optimal conﬁg-
uration, with noncooperative behavior, which leads to a suboptimal conﬁguration. Werczberger
and Berechman [53] incorporate neighborhood eﬀects into a multinomial model of spatial location
decisions of individuals and ﬁrms and give some numerical simulation results. Certain aspects of
urban interactions have been discussed by Miyao [38], who addresses household location choice and
stability properties of mixed-city equilibrium in the context of city-wide interactions.
There has been some empirical research on the economic consequences of social interactions on
individuals as they pass through various neighborhoods. Kremer [35] ﬁnds signiﬁcant linear eﬀects
on individuals’ education from average education in the census tracts where individuals grew up,
3and Ioannides [29] signiﬁcant nonlinear ones, as well. With the notable exception of Coulson and
Bond [10], empirical research on the impact of neighborhood eﬀects on residential succession is
very limited. These authors test a model, due to Bond and Coulson [5], of the inverse demand
for dwelling unit and neighborhood characteristics, by using data on FHA loans and contextual
data from census tracts. They show that high-income groups are willing to pay more to live in
high-income neighborhoods, but ﬁnd little evidence of an eﬀect of income on the demand for racial
composition. Anas [2] models the behavior of suppliers in the presence of exogenous neighborhood
eﬀects.5
Manski [36] shows how diﬃcult it is to distinguish, by relying entirely on data, among alternative
models of interaction, i.e. situations where individuals’ actions appear to be in response to their
neighbors’ actions rather than their neighbors’ characteristics. Therefore, even if suitable data were
available, careful statistical analysis may have to go beyond just appending statistical descriptions
of a person’s neighborhood to her own personal economic and social characteristics and then just
running regressions.
A number of studies of urban neighborhood interactions originate in the context of evaluating
the urban renewal projects of the 1960’s. Davis and Whinston [13], Rothenberg [42] and Schall
[43] study housing maintenance behavior. Stahl [47] is an exhaustive study of the consequences of
neighborhood eﬀects for replacement/rehabilitation of housing and housing maintenance. Spatial
proximity is important in understanding neighborhood dynamics [ Strange [48] ], including such
phenomena as neighborhood tipping, where except for the path-breaking work by Schelling [44]
there is little analytical work that can be used to structure empirical investigation. There appears
to be no research in the hedonic analysis if housing markets literature on interactive property valu-
ations, perhaps because of the lack of data. A recent exhaustive survey by Sheppard [45] mentions
5I am aware of two other works that examine neighborhood interactions empirically, both of which use local data.
Galster [20] reports empirical results using data from special surveys conducted in Wooster, Ohio, and Minneapolis,
Minnesota. He shows that social interactions are very important in explaining home upkeep behavior. Homeowners
in “most-cohesive neighborhoods” spend 28–45% more on upkeep. There is also evidence of social-threshold eﬀects,
in that social interactions are important only if “collective solidarity sentiments result.” More importantly, Galster
indicates that he has found evidence in favor of powerful self-fulﬁlling expectations: “There is no evidence that lower
income or black homeowners are less likely to undermaintain their homes’ exteriors than are higher-income or white
homeowners. ... Yet, the dynamics of succession and transition can generate expectations ... that the physical
and/or the socioeconomic quality of the neighborhood will fall.” [Galster op. cit., , p. 240.], and that evidence would
exonerate the behavior of the “in-migrating” households as the key cause of neighborhood deterioration. Spivack
[46] uses data on code violations from Providence, Rhode Island, and ﬁnds some impact of neighborhood variables:
ownership patterns and vacancies are the most inﬂuential determinants of maintenance and upkeep.
4spatial interactions only in the context of the possible importance of spatial autocorrelation [ ibid.,
p. 1618 ], but cites no research on social interactions as such. The only related paper is Kiel and
Zabel [34], except that their emphasis is on comparing the relative performance of cluster-level vs.
census-tract level variables by means of reduced-form models only. The present paper is closely re-
lated to Ioannides [30], which estimates models of interdependence of maintenance decisions among
neighbors, and to Ioannides and Zabel [31] and [32], which estimate models of housing demand,
when demand decisions by neighbors are interdependent.6
A lively literature has addressed issues of strategic interactions at higher levels of aggregation,
like among local governments. For an example, see Brueckner [7] who examines urban growth
controls as a case in point, and Brueckner [8] for a comprehensive methodological review of the
literature on empirical studies of strategic interactions among governments.
3 Data
The American Housing Survey (AHS) is a panel of dwelling units, which was redesigned in 1985 to
involve more than 50,000 dwelling units that are interviewed each two years. This paper explores
an additional but neglected feature of the data, that is, data on neighborhood clusters, which are
available for years 1985, 1989, and 1993 [51]. In those years only, a random sample of originally 680
— and subsequently more, as we will see shortly below — urban units were selected and for each
one of them (up to) ten neighbor units were interviewed. Each such cluster includes the randomly
chosen member of the national ﬁle (which is an urban AHS unit), the so-called kernel, and the
ten homes closest to it [Hadden and Leger [24], p. 1-51]. The cluster may contain fewer than 10
units, because of the pattern of urban development or non-response. Appendix A provides details
on sample structure and data availability. The empirical investigation reported here is based only
on data from the 1985 and 1989 waves of the AHS data.7
6Only a small number of papers, including Coulson et al. [11], Gabriel and Rosenthal [18], [19], Hoyt and Rosenthal
[26], Hardman and Ioannides [25], Ioannides [27], Ioannides [30], Ioannides and Zabel [31] [32] and Kiel and Zabel
[34] have utilized the AHS clusters data to date. The latter four papers involve the only previous uses of the 1993
clusters data. Hardman and Ioannides are exploring neighborhood income distributions. Kiel and Zabel compare
the performance of clusters data against mean census tract-level attributes by utilizing (privileged) access to census-
tract coding of the data. Ioannides and Zabel [31], [32] aim at estimating housing demand in the presence of social
interactions, which requires use of additional data, beyond what the present paper is employing.
7I conducted extensive econometric analyses with data from the 1993 wave, as well, but at the end decided to
report results with 1993. Basically, the greater increase in the number of observations from 1989 to 1993 over that
5The 1985 data contain observations mainly from 630 clusters (neighborhoods) of at most 11
units each. Additional observations come from larger clusters, making the total number of clusters
equal to 680. Additional details on the structure of the data for 1989 and 1993, such as observation
counts on new clusters, new households and new units, etc., and their geographic distribution are
given in Appendix A. Additional units in existing clusters were included in 1989 to reﬂect additional
units that had been added within the perimeter of the “neighborhood.” By 1993, a maximum of
20 neighboring units were allowed per cluster.8
Data are missing for a variety of reasons. Units may be vacant, about 10% in all waves. Even
in occupied units, interviews could not be completed in some instances. A basic set of descriptive
statistics are given in Table 1. Details on the construction of variables are given in Appendix A.9
Referring to Table 1, the mix of socioeconomic characteristics of the members of neighborhoods
is of particular interest. In 1985, 1989, and 1993, respectively, 84.1%, 83.2%, and 81.3% of the
kernels have household heads who are White. When one looks at housing tenure, 55.5%, 55.2% and
51.5% of all kernels are owner-occupied, while the corresponding numbers for the entire sample are
54.0%, 54.0% and 53.1%. Not surprisingly, the dispersion of the cluster-averaged data is smaller
than that of the full sample. While the mean value of household income for the kernels, which
make up a random subsample of the main AHS sample of the U.S. population, and that of cluster
means are very close to one another, as one would indeed expect, the dispersion is much larger
than one would expect from statistical sampling theory. Roughly speaking, random samples of size
ten should produce a standard deviation of roughly one-third of that of the kernels. The observed
standard deviations are at least twice as much as that, which implies that the distribution of income
within neighborhoods is much more dispersed than what random sampling would imply. This
suggests considerable heterogeneity within neighborhoods and does not contradict self-selection in
neighborhoods ( Hardman and Ioannides [25] and Ioannides [27] ).
There is substantial turnover within the four-year span between two successive waves that I am
working with. Moves, on one hand, are beneﬁcial in making the sample more representative, in
from 1985 to 1989 may not be exploited, primarily because it cannot be translated into an increase in the number of
data, as availability of retrospective information is restricted by 1989 data.
8I am grateful to Barbara T. Williams, US Bureau of the Census, for this clariﬁcation.
9See also Ioannides [30], Table 1, who compares data from the Statistical Abstract of the United States and from
my own processing of the AHS data for the purpose of establishing the representativeness of the AHS data. Appendix
A, in ibid., gives additional information on the data.
6principle, because individuals may reassess their information and units get revalued by the market.
They do, on the other, cause sample selection problems. Because of the pattern of new entrants
(clusters, units and individuals) there is actually little data left with a structure which may be
amenable to estimation with panel techniques. After I had performed a number of econometric
experiments with the two pair of successive cross-sections that are available for estimating a dynamic
model, I decided to present only one, with data from two successive periods, 1985 and 1989. Still,
the period covered by the data oﬀers some distinct advantages. Great real estate appreciation
during the 1980’s, gave way to depreciations during the late 1980’s and the early 1990’s, and both
episodes exhibited pronounced regional variations.
4 Estimation of Neighborhood Interaction
As this paper is purely empirical, I postulate that the valuations of property values within small
residential neighborhoods are interdependent. There are many reasons why this might be so. First,
diﬀerent neighbors’ maintenance decisions may reﬂect, in part, decisions by their neighbors, that
is, individuals might react directly to maintenance decisions of their neighbors or to the outcome of
such decisions. That is, in a Nash equilibrium, the value of each property is a function of the vector
of shocks aﬀecting all neighborhood properties and of the vector of individual wealths. One would
expect that, typically, residential neighborhoods would include neighbors of various “vintages,”
that is, households that have moved into the neighborhood at diﬀerent times. Also, neighborhoods
are mixed in terms renters and owners. While renters make decisions in terms of current prices and
conditions, owners’ valuations are likely to be serially correlated. Therefore, by equilibrium in each
neighborhood, the presence of continuing residents causes prices and thus property values in the
neighborhood to reﬂect maintenance shocks and lagged property values. Furthermore, the inﬂow
of new residents causes prices and thus property values to reﬂect neighborhood eﬀects through
newcomers’ valuations. Nash equilibrium in each neighborhood reﬂects the fact that new residents
have chosen a neighborhood because it oﬀered higher utility than all of their alternative courses
of action. Similarly, old residents have chosen to remain in a neighborhood because it oﬀered
higher utility than all of their alternative courses of action. Neighborhood composition based on
choice is critical in understanding self-selection. Therefore, the occupants of each neighborhood
7cluster are not a random sample of the population. Or put diﬀerently, individuals’ incomes in each
neighborhood (and other characteristics) may be neither identical nor distributed according to the
national income distribution ( Ioannides [27] ). In this paper, I take the composition of diﬀerent
neighborhoods as given.10 I also take housing prices as given.11
Following a (by now standard) typology of social interaction models proposed by Manski [36]
and [37], one may identify two types of social eﬀects. An endogenous social eﬀect is present, if an in-
dividual’s behavior is aﬀected by the actual, (or expected), behavior of her neighbors. This “keeping
up with the Joneses” eﬀect gives rise to a so-called “social multiplier,” through which, as Manski
[36] notes, policy intervention works to impact the behavior of an entire social group. Another type
of social eﬀect refers to agents’ responding to the average (or some other measure of aggregation for
the distribution) of various individual attributes of interest within the neighborhood, such as racial
and ethnic composition of the neighborhood, neighborhood income distribution and the like.12 This
is the so-called exogenous social, or contextual, eﬀect, whereby one cares about, or reacts to, one’s
neighbors’ attributes, rather than one’s neighbors’ actions. Distinguishing between endogenous and
exogenous social eﬀects is important. 13 There may also be a correlated eﬀect among residential
neighbors, if all dwelling units in a neighborhood tend to be occupied by individuals of similar
socioeconomic characteristics.14
Let yi·ht denote the valuation by individual h who occupies speciﬁc housing unit i in cluster ·;
· = 1;:::;Kt; at time t; Yt denotes the vector made up of all the yi·ht’s, the vector of endogenous
10A straightforward implication of a residential sorting model, like that of Epple and Sieg [17], is that even if
individual utility is separable in the inﬂuence of the neighborhood housing stock for both new and continuing residents,
in which case housing demand by new residents is independent of the neighborhood housing stock, selection introduces
such dependence. This follows from the fact that associating neighborhood choice with utility comparisons implies
bounds which themselves depend on neighborhood housing stocks.
11Miyao [38] and Durlauf [14] oﬀer models where community-speciﬁc housing prices reﬂect the socioeconomic
characteristics of their residents. Ioannides and Zabel [32] explore empirically the extent in which prices reﬂect such
characteristics.
12Such an eﬀect could reﬂect a variety of motivations. E.g., the fact that a neighborhood may becoming occupied
by higher income people is perceived as a good omen for a neighborhood’s future, by higher income people, but a
bad one, by lower income people.
13See for example, Manski’s critique of Crane [12] regarding confusion over those two types of eﬀects. Crane poses
an epidemic model of endogenous neighborhood eﬀects, where dropout and childbearing behavior by teenagers is
inﬂuenced by the frequency of such behavior within the neighborhood. However, Crane estimates a contextual-eﬀects
model, where a teenager’s behavior is inﬂuenced by the occupational composition of her neighborhood.
14This may come about through selection, which as I argued above, may involve more than one characteristic.
Consequently, selection may produce imperfect segregation in terms of, say, wealth or income. Similar could be an
eﬀect caused by response to an unobserved shock, such a change in the vicinity of the urban area, or by an unobserved
individual characteristic.
8variables here.15 The above intuitive discussion suggests that yi·ht may be speciﬁed as a function,
in general, of the subvector of Yt that is made up of the endogenous variables associated with h’s
neighbors, of a vector of a household’s own socioeconomic characteristics, zht, and of a number
of additional factors, such as variables reﬂecting socioeconomic characteristics of one’s neighbors,
conditional on a neighborhood’s socioeconomic and geographic characteristics, and on dwelling unit
characteristics, (zhtjx·t;qit): I take these characteristics as given and do not attempt to correct for
sample selection bias associated with individual characteristics and neighborhood characteristics.
16 The previous discussion allows me to specify the empirical model so as yi·ht is a function of the
endogenous variable’s own lagged value, yi·ht¡1; of neighbors’ housing consumption, ΠiYt, of own
socioeconomic characteristics, zht; and of socioeconomic characteristics of neighbors conditional on
neighborhood and dwelling unit characteristics, E[zhtjx·t;qit]:
yi·ht = ® + ¹yi·ht¡1 + ¯ΠiYt + ´zht + °E[zhtjx·t;qit] + ui·ht; (1)
where Π denotes a known weighting matrix of dimensions I£I that deﬁnes spatial interaction (and
is discussed further below), and Πi is its ith row; ®;¯ and ¹ denote scalar unknown parameters, and
´ and ° vectors of unknown parameters. With the data at my disposal, I cannot measure the term
E[zhtjx·t;qit]; cannot identify °; and therefore set ° = 0: The error term ui·ht in the RHS of (1)
captures the impact of factors, over and above observable ones, which are observed by individuals
but unobserved by the econometrician, which I assume to be conditional on neighborhood and
individual dwelling unit characteristics:
E[ui·htjx·t;qit] = ±xx·t + ±qqit; (2)
where ±x;±q; denote vectors of unknown parameters.
Referring again to the Manski typology, the term ¯ΠiYt in the RHS of Equ. (1) reﬂects an
endogenous social eﬀect. Such a social eﬀect is central to the notion of neighborhood eﬀects: a
person’s behavior depends on the actual behavior of her neighbors. The term °E[zhtjx·t;qit] would
have expressed a contextual eﬀect, that is, given the characteristics x·t of the neighborhood ·
where unit i is located and unit i’s own characteristics qit , this term would give the eﬀect of
15See Kiel and Carson [33] for previous work on owner valuations.
16Ioannides and Zabel [32] pursues that line of inquiry.
9the distributions of variables of potential interest, like racial and ethnic composition, within the
neighborhood. The conditional mean of ui·ht, from (2), ±xx·t + ±qqit; expresses correlated eﬀects
pertaining to valuation: units in the same neighborhood with characteristics x·t and individual
dwelling units with characteristics qit tend to have similar unobserved individual characteristics.
We shall see shortly below that by setting ° = 0; such a term is excluded, and in eﬀect my
speciﬁcation of the error introduces something akin to a contextual eﬀect. The term ´zht reﬂects
the direct eﬀect of the owner’s characteristics upon the valuation of the dwelling they occupy, in
part because of taste, income etc., or the decisions about maintenance that they make. However, to
the extent that selection is present, zht proxies for the socioeconomic characteristics of neighbors.
As Manski [36] emphasizes, if ° = 0; then the remaining (endogenous) social eﬀect may be readily
identiﬁed.
I note that it is diﬃcult to distinguish the above empirical model from a hedonic model of
property values with social interactions. Yet, it is important to do so. A pure hedonic model
of property values would be based on a regression like Equ. (1) along with an error speciﬁcation
according to (2), subject to the following conditions. First, ¹ = 0; as there is no reason why current
dwelling unit characteristics should not be suﬃcient to determine market value. Second, ´ = 0; as
the owner-occupant’s own characteristics are not a market attribute, at least in theory; however,
the characteristics of one’s neighbors, represented here by °E[zhtjx·t;qit]; are. If they are not
identiﬁable, then presence of a term like ´zht suﬃces for bringing in the eﬀect of the characteristics
of one’s neighbors either because the characteristics or neighbors are correlated (through sorting),
or through the endogenous eﬀect ¯ΠiYt; as we shall see shortly. With this in mind, we proceed
with examining the impact of the spatial structure of the data.17
4.1 Spatial Interaction
If the kernel and all neighbors are treated symmetrically and interaction is global within each
cluster, the spatial weighting matrix Π; employed in Equ. (1) above, is block-diagonal of size I £I;
17This model combines certain features of Manski [36], especially its spatial model, ibid., p. 537, Equ. (7), who
examines estimation problems for social interaction models. The spatial interaction model “implies that the sample
members know who each other are and choose their outcomes only after having been selected into the sample ” [ ibid.,
p. 537 ]. In contrast to the principal model in the latter, in (1) social interactions are expressed in terms of actual
behavior, Yt; instead of expected behavior of one’s neighbors, conditional on observables [x·t;qit]; E[Ytjx·t;qit]:




; i = 1;:::;I;j 2 n(i);i 6= j; and ¼ii = 0;otherwise; (3)
where ni denotes the set of i’s neighbors and ni its size, ni = jn(i)j: The endogenous eﬀect is
generated within the neighborhood sample consisting of the kernel and its neighborhood cluster,
rather than within the entire population from which the sample was drawn. 18 When no confusion
arises, I use n and refer to cluster size as a constant, even though it does vary within the data.
The simplest such model obtains when in (1), I set ¹ = ´ = ¿ = 0; and similarly ±x = ±q =
(0;¢¢¢;0); and ΠYt is simply the vector that assigns to each unit the mean valuation of all other
units in the neighborhood. That is, Equ. (1) simpliﬁes to:





yj·h0 + ¸i + "i: (4)
I assume, like Glaeser and Scheinkman [23], that ¸i above is a cluster-speciﬁc random eﬀect,
with mean zero and variance ¾2
¸; which is uncorrelated with "i: This implies that across the data,














¶2 3(n ¡ 1) ¡ 2¯(n ¡ 2) ¡ ¯2
(n ¡ 1 + ¯)2 : (5)
This model can be estimated with maximum likelihood. It will be referred to below as the mean
ﬁeld model of neighborhood interactions.
In contrast to the mean ﬁeld case of interactions, where each individual is aﬀected by the average
behavior of all of her neighbors, the literature has investigated the consequences of alternative
18As an example consider three kernels, · = 1;2;3; with associated cluster sizes n1 = 3;n2 = 4;n3 = 3: Variable
neighborhood cluster sizes are due to missing values. The weighting matrix has size: I = n1+n2+n3 = 10: In writing
the respective matrix I assume that the vector Y is formed by stacking neighborhood by neighborhood, and within











0 1=2 1=2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1=2 0 1=2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1=2 1=2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 1=3 1=3 1=3 0 0 0
0 0 0 1=3 0 1=3 1=3 0 0 0
0 0 0 1=3 1=3 0 1=3 0 0 0
0 0 0 1=3 1=3 1=3 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1=2 1=2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1=2 0 1=2











11patterns (topologies) of local interactions; see [28]. Of particular interest is the circular interaction
pattern ( ibid., and [22] ), where each individual observes the behavior of only one other one, so that
the connections form a circle. For such a case, drawing from [28], we have for mean and variance










1 ¡ ¯2: (6)
This model can be estimated with maximum likelihood. It will be referred to below as the circular
model of neighborhood interactions. To my knowledge, neither the mean ﬁeld nor the circular
models have been estimated before.
4.1.1 Spatial Stochastic Structure
I refer to (1), set ° = 0; and deﬁne the unobserved component of the correlated eﬀect, ²i·ht; as the
deviation of ui·ht from its mean, conditional on neighborhood and dwelling unit characteristics,
²i·ht = ui·ht ¡ E[ui·htjx·t;qit] = ui·ht ¡ (±xx·t + ±qqit):
Let ²t and ut denote the vectors of size I obtained by stacking up in the obvious way errors
²i·ht; deﬁned above, and ui·ht; deﬁned in (1). Unfortunately, I may not deﬁne a richer stochastic
structure, where we would distinguish a time-invariant unit-speciﬁc eﬀect associated with unit
i in neighborhood ·; and a time-invariant individual-speciﬁc eﬀect associated with individual h;
as individuals are not separately identiﬁed from units. Speciﬁc units are inseparably associated
with their neighborhoods, and thus likely to share a individual eﬀect that is common to all units
belonging to the same neighborhood.
The most general model would assume that ²t, the unobserved component of the correlated
eﬀect deﬁned above, consists of a neighborhood interactions term and a random error,
²t = ¿Π²t + "t;
where "t is a I £ 1 vector of purely random errors, with E("t) = ¶I0; ¶I is the unit column
vector of size I, and Var("t) = ¾2
"I, where I is the unit diagonal matrix of dimension I: The
term ¿Π²t has the interpretation that the error terms for all observations contain ¿ times the
average error realized by all of each unit’s neighbors. Spatial correlation in errors, represented here
12by the spatial autocorrelation coeﬃcient ¿, may be present when unobserved spatially correlated
variables, possibly due to self-selection, aﬀect the endogenous variable of interest. Consistency of
social interaction requires ²t = [I ¡ ¿Π]¡1"t; provided that the matrix [I ¡ ¿Π] is invertible.
Equ. (1) may be rewritten in vector form as:
Yt = ®I¶I + ¹Yt¡1 + ¯ΠYt + ´Zt + ±xXt + ±qQt + [I ¡ ¿Π]¡1"t; (7)
where the vector Yt stacks the individual observations, and the matrices Xt; Qt; Zt are deﬁned in
terms of the respective vectors of characteristics x·t;qit;zht in the obvious way. Equ. (7) represents
the endogenous variables as a system of simultaneous equations. It expresses the condition for Nash
equilibrium in neighborhood interactions as a structural form.
Under the Nash assumption that individuals take their neighbors’ actions as given and that
[I ¡ ¯Π] is invertible, I solve (7) as a simultaneous system for Yt to obtain:
Yt = ®[I ¡ ¯Π]¡1¶I + [I ¡ ¯Π]¡1¹Yt¡1
+[I ¡ ¯Π]¡1 [±xXt + ±qQt + ´Zt] + [I ¡ ¯Π]¡1[I ¡ ¿Π]¡1"t: (8)
After elementary but tedious transformations, 19 Equ. (8) may be transformed further to yield
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¹¯ Yt¡1 + ¯ X0
t±x + ¯ Q0
t±q + ¯ Z0
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¤
+ ¯ "t; (9)
where ¯ "t = [I ¡¯Π]¡1[I ¡¿Π]¡1"t; and vectors and matrices in the RHS of (9) with bars indicate,
for each observation i; the average, within i’s neighborhood n(i), values of the entries in the ith row
19I note that [I ¡ ¯Π] is block-diagonal, with blocks corresponding to neighborhoods ; for any neighborhood of
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t denotes the vector of size I obtained by replacing each component i of "t by the average
value of "t among unit i’s neighbors including itself. Inspection of the RHS of Equ. (10) suggests
that its variance-covariance matrix may be written in terms of ¾2
"; ¯; ¿; and n; which is exogenous
and ﬁxed at 10.21 So, in sum, the most general model implies correlated random eﬀects that
derive from spatial interaction in unobserved components. Ignoring them leads to ineﬃciency.
Unfortunately, I have not been able to estimate this model. I oﬀer this analysis here in the hope
that it would receive further attention in the future.
4.2 Estimation Strategy
Pausing ﬁrst to summarize, I have derived the implications of Nash equilibrium within each neigh-
borhood by means of a system of equations in structural form, Equ. (7), and in reduced form,
Equ.’s (9) and (10). Both those systems may be estimated with the AHS neighborhood clusters
data, where care must be taken to allow for spatial stochastic dependence. Both those models
allow one to identify the eﬀect of social interactions. This formulation excludes the possibility
that individual members of a cluster in our sample also interact with other individuals outside the
cluster. Such inﬂuences must be treated as omitted variables. Because of this and considering the
complexity of the above model, I will test below the spatial interaction in the error structure by
means solely of cluster-speciﬁc random eﬀects without spatial autocorrelation.




















21Manski’s result still applies, of course, in that separate identiﬁcation of ° from ¯; when ° is not equal to 0,
requires knowledge of E[ZtjXt;Qt]: This follows from (7) by solving for the expectation of the average Yt in each
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which agrees with Manski. By substituting back in the expression for E[YtjXt;Qt;Zt]; I have that the coeﬃcient of
E[ ¯ ZtjXt;Qt] is equal to
°+¯´
1¡¯ ; which agrees with Manski, again. As we argued above, E[ ¯ ZtjXt;Qt] depends upon
properties of the matching mechanism in the housing market and is likely to depend upon (Xt;Qt); possibly in a
complicated non-linear manner, which itself may buy identiﬁcation, as Brock and Durlauf [6] emphasize. Ioannides
and Zabel [32] pursue this line of research.
14and which derive from (1). Next I turn to the reduced-form model, Equ. (9), and impose the
condition ¹ = 0: This model may be estimated by OLS, if the constraints associated with the
presence of ¯ in the coeﬃcients for X;Q;Z; and ¯ X; ¯ Q; ¯ Z; are ignored, or by GLS, in order to
account for random eﬀects associated with diﬀerent units belonging the same cluster. This model
may also be estimated by maximum likelihood, where we allow for ni; the number of units in each
cluster to vary by cluster, as is indeed the case in the data.
The full model according to Equ. (9) may also be estimated. The presence of the lagged term





1¡¯¹¯ Yt¡1; provide an additional route to the identiﬁcation of ¯ from the




dependent of ¹: This ratio exactly identiﬁes the social interaction coeﬃcient ¯; as the neighborhood
size n is exogenous. It is larger the larger is ¯; and is not bounded upwards by 1. This conﬁrms the
critical role, alluded to above, of the presence of the own lagged value in the RHS of (1). However,
the variation in ni in the data is substantial and, therefore, this method may be relied upon only
as an approximation.
Finally, I can estimate the model by working with Equ. (7) as a structural form. I note that if
¯ = 0; then the corresponding social interaction terms vanish and only each unit’s own regressors
are present. In that case, the only inﬂuence of the spatial interaction structure is through the error
structure, where the spatial interaction is present in the deﬁnition of the error according to (10),







"t: That is, even in the absence of
social interaction, spatial autocorrelation has the eﬀect of magnifying the eﬀect of the individual
i.i.d. stochastic shocks "t: If ¿; the spatial autocorrelation coeﬃcient, is small, ¯ "t is a multiple of
"t; with a factor of proportionality close to, but greater than, 1. The factor of proportionality is
increasing in ¿ but the variance-covariance matrix is diagonal. However, as I mentioned above, I
will set ¿ = 0; and thus ignore the spatial autocorrelation in the errors and instead estimate just a
random eﬀects speciﬁcation.22
22If social interactions are present, that is if ¯ 6= 0; (10) implies that the variance-covariance matrix of the error
structure in (9) is non-diagonal and it contains both ¯ and ¿: If spatial autocorrelation is absent, then the variance-
covariance matrix is diagonal. GLS may be adapted in order to estimate ¿ from the variance-covariance matrix of
neighboring units. If, on the other hand, ¯ is close to 1, then the social interaction terms become dominant. Whereas
the estimation of ¿ rests entirely on the error structure, estimation of ¯ involves both the error structure and the
coeﬃcients of several RHS variables. Unfortunately, it is not possible to identify the spatial autocorrelation coeﬃcient
155 Empirical Results
I discuss ﬁrst estimates of the mean-ﬁeld and circular interactions models, according to Equ. (5)
and (6) by means of maximum likelihood, which are given on Table 2. The estimates for the mean-
ﬁeld model without and with a random eﬀect, respectively in columns 2 and 3 of Table 2, imply
a highly signiﬁcant estimate for ¯; ranging from .683 to .618, but an insigniﬁcant cluster random
eﬀect. The estimates for 1993 are very similar and therefore not reported here. Column 4 reports
the estimates for the circular interactions model. This yields an even higher estimate for ¯; 0.770,
which is, again, highly signiﬁcant. These models are signiﬁcant in terms of the maximum likelihood
ratio test. As I indicated above, these are the ﬁrst estimates of these models ever reported.
I discuss next estimates obtained along the lines of Equ. (7) and (9), where I set ¿ = 0: It
is appropriate to summarize how those equations diﬀer. Equation (7) is a structural form, where
the dependent variable yi·ht is a function of its own lagged value, yi·ht¡1; of the mean of the
dependent variable among i’s neighboring units (that is, the ith row of ¯ΠYt), of individual h’s
own characteristics, ´zht; of the characteristics of unit i’s neighborhood cluster, ±xxit; and of unit
i0s own characteristics, ±qqit: Identiﬁcation of the latter eﬀect requires a richer data set that allows
one to study matching of individuals with neighborhoods and dwelling units ( see Ioannides and
Zabel [32] ). Therefore, I set ° = 0:
The social interactions eﬀect ¯ may be identiﬁed as the coeﬃcient of the predicted mean of
the dependent variable among a unit’s neighbors. This requires 2SLS estimation in the presence
of correlated disturbances, the latter being induced the spatial stochastic structure, and is subject
to the usual identiﬁcation restrictions. Equ. (9), on the other hand, is a reduced form, where the
dependent variable yi·ht is a function of a similar set of regressors as in the case of the reduced
form, except that identiﬁcation of the social interactions eﬀect now rests in part on the own lagged
value coeﬃcient.
The estimates along the lines of Equ. (7), reported in Table 3, are typical of the entire set of
regressions I have performed with both pairs of consecutive waves of data, 1985 to 1989 and 1989
to 1993. I have chosen to concentrate on the 1989 cross-section with retrospective information for
without carrying out maximum likelihood estimations, which are extremely tedious in this setting and at the end did
not work out for me. That the covariance structure of (9) may also aid identiﬁcation has been noted by Case [9] and
Moﬃtt [39].
161985, when appropriate. This choice was dictated by the fair amount of turnover, in both units
and households, and the addition of new clusters and dwelling units in 1989 and in 1993, relative
to 1985 and to 1989, respectively, which is documented in [30], Appendix A. Speciﬁcally, including
all three waves while retaining the panel structure would introduce considerable heterogeneity and
reduce the sample size.
The dependent variable is the log of the self-reported value of owner-occupied dwellings. Table 3
reports estimation results for a conventional and an augmented hedonic regression, and interactive
regressions along the lines of Equations (9) and (7). Column 1 is a hedonic regression, with
the cluster and unit characteristics as regressors, that is variables Xt;Qt; only. Columns 2 and
3 report a hedonic model, where the traditional explanatory variables have been augmented to
include in addition to cluster characteristics, Xt; and dwelling unit own characteristics, Qt; the
characteristics of neighboring units, ¯ Qt; and the own socioeconomic characteristics of the owner
and of her neighbors, Zt; ¯ Zt; respectively. Note that to save space, the entries of Column 3 for the
Q’s and Z’s correspond to ¯ Qt; ¯ Zt; respectively, that is, to one’s neighbors’ average characteristics.
E.g., the entry for age in column 3 is for age; the average age of neighboring dwelling units. My
ability to run such a regression depends entirely on the availability of the neighborhood clusters
data. Columns 4, 5 and 6 report interactive valuation regressions. That is, Columns 4 and 5 report
results for the reduced-form model (9) with cluster-speciﬁc random eﬀects using GLS. Finally,
Column 6 reports results for the structural model (7) using 2SLS. The presentation of the results
in Table 3 is organized according to groups of explanatory variables, that is of cluster-speciﬁc
variables, the X’s, of dwelling-unit variables, the Q’s, and of individual-speciﬁc variables, the Z’s.
Both groups of regressors, cluster-speciﬁc variables, the X’s, and dwelling-unit variables, the
Q’s, are important explanatory variables in the hedonic regressions and the interactive valuation
regressions. Hedonic regressions, like the one reported on Column 1, reﬂect market valuations and
therefore condition only on cluster characteristics and dwelling unit characteristics. They exclude
individual occupant characteristics. Some of the neighborhood characteristics may be interpreted
as exogenous social, or contextual, eﬀects, like per cent of owner-occupants, of household heads
who are White, and of vacancies in the neighborhood. Neighborhood (cluster) speciﬁc variables
performed quite well in several regressions. Some of them imply nonlinear eﬀects, such as, in
17particular, cluster-averages for race and for vacancies, for which I have estimated cubic polynomial
structures. All of these groups are signiﬁcant.
In the hedonic regressions, reported respectively in Columns 1 and 2-3, I treat observations be-
longing to the same cluster as independent. When I add, in the regression reported in Columns 2-3,
contextual information associated with the characteristics of neighboring units and of neighbors,
I also include the occupant’s own characteristics. This is not standard for hedonic regressions. I
justify the presence of individual own characteristics in hedonic regressions because of high correla-
tion with the respective variables for neighbors.23 This makes it harder to interpret the regression
coeﬃcients but does improve the overall ﬁt, raising the R2 from 0.428 to 0.530. It is therefore more
appropriate to examine the performance of the explanatory variables in Column 1. All estimated
coeﬃcients generally accord with intuition.
As I discussed in the previous section, spatial interactions may induce a stochastic structure
within each cluster, which may be naturally modelled by means of cluster-speciﬁc random eﬀects.
I also estimate cluster-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, and test those two stochastic structures, as well. I
have, however, chosen to report only the model with cluster-speciﬁc random eﬀects. Columns 4-5
present results with cluster-speciﬁc random eﬀects along the lines of reduced-form model (9). All t
statistics reported are robust with respect to heteroscedasticity associated with the neighborhood
clusters. Using ﬁxed eﬀects appears to over-parameterize the model24, yielding an implausibly high
R2 of 0.9979. While a substantial improvement in the quality of ﬁt is, of course, to be expected,
the fact that the social interactions variable remains signiﬁcant is highly supportive of the notion
of neighborhood eﬀects. The signiﬁcance of cluster-speciﬁc eﬀects of either type is, in and of itself,
an indication of the signiﬁcance of social eﬀects.25
Fixed versus random eﬀect speciﬁcations may be tested by means of the Hausman speciﬁcation
test. I test the null hypothesis that the random eﬀects are uncorrelated with the regressors, which
23Unlike Kiel and Zabel [34], I do not have access,for the purpose of this paper, to information on census tracts to
which clusters belong. Therefore, I cannot link the Xt variables to census tract level data. However, it is noteworthy
that Kiel and Zabel ﬁnd means and standard deviations of the cluster and census tract level neighborhood variables
to be fairly similar and the correlation between the two sets of variables is .82. As they put it, “overall, there does
not seem to be a great deal of diﬀerence between the cluster and the tract measures. ... When comparisons are made
in a regression context, we ﬁnd evidence that the cluster variables have greater explanatory power than do tract level
variables.” [ ibid., p. 23 ]. Also, Ioannides and Zabel [31] use occupant data from a larger sample of the AHS, the
entire metropolitan sample, as proxies for neighborhood eﬀects.
24I owe this remark to a referee.
25See Munshi and Myaux [40] for a related application of ﬁxed eﬀects as social eﬀects.
18is required by GLS theory. Under that null hypothesis, both the ﬁxed eﬀects and the random
eﬀects estimators are consistent, but the ﬁxed eﬀects estimator is ineﬃcient. The Hausman test
does reject, in my case, the null hypothesis very strongly. I think that an appropriate interpretation
of this rejection is that omitted variables in the speciﬁcation of the model with random eﬀects is
the culprit, as the random eﬀects model otherwise ﬁts reasonably well. I should note that for the
property valuation model, the within and between R2’s are .116 and .787, respectively, with the
fraction of the overall variance that is due to the random eﬀect is 0.394. I interpret the signiﬁcance
of the random eﬀects model on its own as lending support to the spatial stochastic structure that
was introduced in the preceding section.
The reduced form model contains both the lagged dependent variable, Y85; and the lagged
average value among each individual’s neighbors in the cluster, ¯ Y85. Both these variables are highly
signiﬁcant and improve the overall ﬁt. In fact, the estimate of the eﬀect of the latter, at 0.317, is
larger than that of the former, 0.190, while both are highly statistically signiﬁcant, implying a more
important role for the social interaction eﬀect. I interpret these results as evidence of signiﬁcant
social interaction in neighborhoods, where individuals are aﬀected by the valuation behavior of
their neighbors.
Recall the discussion in the previous section that a point estimate of the social interactions
coeﬃcient may be recovered from the ratio of the above two coeﬃcients, n
n¡1
¯
1¡¯. This would, of
course, be only approximate because cluster sizes do vary across the sample. Using a value for n
equal to the average cluster size, ¯ n = 6:7;26 the implied value of ˆ ¯ is 0.587, and is reported on Table
4. Also reported there are, for ease of comparison, the estimates for ¯ that are obtained directly
from the mean ﬁeld and circular interactions models, as well as the structural form model, which
we discuss further below. The reduced form model also includes as regressors the averages of the
neighboring units’ characteristics and of their occupants, variables ¯ Qt; ¯ Zt: Note that to save space,
the entries of Column 5 for the Q’s and Z’s correspond to the neighbors’ average characteristics,
¯ Q’s and ¯ Z’s, respectively.
It is interesting to note that the estimated coeﬃcients for those of the X’s, the (Q; ¯ Q)’s and
the (Z; ¯ Z)’s that are present in both Columns 2-3 and 4-5 are quite similar, except that those
26This number diﬀers from 10 considerably, because of missing values, of diﬀerent cluster sample sizes and of the
fact that observations for renters may not be used in these regressions.
19in Columns 2-3 have higher statistical signiﬁcance than their counterparts in Columns 4-5. This
is obviously caused by the presence in the reduced-form regression, according to Equ. (9) of the
previous section, of the lagged value of the dependent variable, of the average valuation among
one’s neighbors, and of cluster-speciﬁc random eﬀects. This regression is reported in Columns 4-5
above. In fact, from my perspective, it is remarkable that the coeﬃcients of the X’s, the (Q; ¯ Q)’s
and the (Z; ¯ Z)’s retain any signiﬁcance at all.
I note that while the t statistics I report in Columns 4-5 are obtained from GLS, I have also
been concerned about correcting for the fact that the social interactions term is a predicted value.
Unfortunately, the model is very diﬃcult to estimate by means of 2SLS with standard econometric
packages while still allowing for random eﬀects. While the full correction in the presence of indi-
vidual eﬀects is quite complicated, it turns out not to matter in this case, and the t statistics I
report are actually accurate.27 If housing markets do price properties correctly, we would expect
that social interactions would make their presence felt even if we were to exclude the lagged value
of the dependent variable. Pure curiosity suggests that this is worth a try. Leaving out the lagged
value makes the estimate of the social interactions coeﬃcient much larger but does not aﬀect the
estimates of the other coeﬃcients.
A noteworthy result is that the estimated coeﬃcient for income for the property valuation model
are .031 and .020, from Columns 4 and 6, and both statistically signiﬁcant. These coeﬃcients are
a bit puzzling, because they may be interpreted as income elasticities of housing consumption for
owners. In an eﬀort to examine whether the numerically weak performance of income is due to
the inclusion of the own lagged value in the property valuation regressions, I also estimated those
models by excluding the own lagged values, and the results were quite similar.28
Next I turn to the estimation of the structural form model according to Equ. (7). I note that
the predicted value among one’s neighbors is included as an explanatory variable. This is clearly
endogenous and is instrumented by means of all exogenous variables. The second-stage regressions
exclude the mean values among one’s neighbors of dwelling unit structural characteristics and
27See Ioannides and Zabel [31] for an explanation of the necessary correction.
28The estimates of the income elasticity of housing valuations obtained here are very similar to those of Ioannides
and Zabel [31], who aim at estimating a housing demand model with neighborhood eﬀects, and to results by others
who have also used the AHS data. Accounting for neighborhood selection, however, does raise the estimates of income
elasticity of housing demand. See [32].
20neighbor household characteristics, that is variables ¯ Qt; ¯ Zt: The results, which are obtained using
2SLS, are reported on Table 3, Column 6, and the estimated standard errors for the structural
form model are suitably corrected. The estimated social interactions coeﬃcient is 0.671 and thus
quite high, even though the own lagged value is also included in the regression and has an estimated
coeﬃcient of .161, which is small but highly signiﬁcant. It is particularly interesting to compare the
structural form results with those of the augmented hedonic. While the same data are used when
one considers both stages of the structural form estimation, the structural form gives a better ﬁt in
terms of R2 and delivers the attractive interpretation of the social interactions coeﬃcient. That is,
one’s neighbors’ valuations is an important explanatory variable of one’s own property valuations.
Again, it is interesting to compare the estimated coeﬃcients for the X’s, the (Q; ¯ Q)’s and the
(Z; ¯ Z)’s across the models. These variables continue to be statistically signiﬁcant as a group, but
very few of them are individually. This must be due to the overwhelming role of the endogenous
social eﬀect, predicted mean among one’s neighbors.
Table 4 oﬀers a juxtaposition of all direct estimates of ¯; Columns 2, 3, 4, and 6, and of the
estimated coeﬃcients on which indirect inference on ¯ rests, Column 5. It thus conﬁrms that all of
our estimates of the social interactions coeﬃcient ¯ are fairly near one another and generally very
signiﬁcant. It is noteworthy that such completely diﬀerent models as the mean ﬁeld and the circular
interactions models yield similar results. Since both the property valuation and its predicted mean
among one’s neighbors are in logs, coeﬃcient ¯ may be interpreted as an elasticity.
6 Conclusions
I explore a relatively neglected feature of data from the American Housing Survey for 1985 and
1989, namely the availability of data on neighborhood clusters in urban areas of the United States.
This feature of the data allows me to estimate a model of social interactions in neighboring property
valuations at the neighborhood level. The concept of a neighborhood invoked here is quite literally
that of a residential neighborhood that consists of a dwelling unit and its ten nearest neighbors.
Therefore, these are novel results in the neighborhood eﬀects literature. Most previous work is
based on using contextual information associated with the census tract where a unit of observation
belongs.
21Using a variety of models, I ﬁnd the impact of social interactions to be quite substantial: the
estimated coeﬃcient ranges from .587 to .770. The social interaction eﬀect is found to be both
stronger and more signiﬁcant then that of the own lagged value, when both are included.
The results provide empirical support for the notion of interactions in residential property
valuations. That is, individuals’ valuations of their properties are inﬂuenced by those of their
neighbors. As a positive ﬁnding, this may be interpreted as supportive of the notion, common in the
real estate world, that neighborhood is very important as a determinant of property valuations. It is
also supportive of the notion that public policy interventions may bring about urban neighborhood
change through a social multiplier.
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27Table 1:
American Housing Survey: Descriptive Statistics
Mean 85 Mean 89 Mean 93 Cv85 Cv89 Cv93
Cluster-averaged data, regular interview
Household income ($) 29140 34282 36503 .574 .569 .557
CPI-Urban (all) 107.6 124.0 144.5
Monthly rent ($) 347 423 485 .470 .496 .465
Property value ($) 76033 100599 105231 .628 .750 .693
CPI-Urban (housing) 107.7 123.0 141.2
Household data (same units)
Date head moved in (19 - -) 74.9 78.3 81.5 .155 .153 .153
Age of head (years) 48.52 49.30 49.68 .362 .355 .354
Highest grade (years) 12.53 12.77 12.94 .279 .267 .253
Race (%-age White) 84.1 83.2 81.3
Household size 2.62 2.60 2.56 .571 .594 .579
Household income ($) 29549 35161 37499 .840 .844 .844
Dwelling unit data
Number of rooms 5.47 5.50 5.50 .345 .336 .334
Unit area (ft
2) 1612.5 1621.2 1614.8 .586 .542 .543
Appreciation ratet;t¡1 (owners) .061 .025 2.62 5.87
Monthly rent (renters) 323 405 465 .520 .522 .484
Property value ($, owners) 79684 107476 111546 .670 .788 .721
28Table 2:
Alternative Social Interaction Models, 1989
Model Mean Field Mean Field with Cluster RE Circular Interaction
1 2 3 4
Intercept 3.604 4.337 2.637
(5.80) (2.16) (4.99)
Social interaction .683 .618 .770
¯ (12.47) (3.49) (16.64)
Random Shock .277 .234 .154
¾2
² (4.43) (1.26) (3.28)




Interactive Regressions for Owners, 1989
Variable LV89 LV89 LV89 LV89 LV89 LV89
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
Variables Hedonic Augmented Hedonic Reduced Form Structural Form
Mean 11.364 11.286 11.286 11.286
Observations 2968 2180 2179 2179
Number Clusters 324 324 324 324
Obs per cluster 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.7
R2; within .116
R2; between .787
R2 overall .428 .530 .626 .617
F or Wald Â2 101.98 48.22 1278 95.65
MSE .620 .534 .387 .482
Cluster Eﬀects No No Random Eﬀects No
S.D. of RE . .312
Fraction of variance due RE . .394
Model OLS OLS GLS 2SLS
Intercept 11.80 13.75 1.164 -.087




Interactive Regressions for Owners, 1989 (Continued)
Variable LV89 LV89 LV89 LV89 LV89 LV89
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
Variables Hedonic Augmented Hedonic Reduced Form Structural Form





Central City .293 .171 .146 .047
SMSA (7.14) (4.18) (2.15) (1.26)
Suburb .391 .272 .206 .065
SMSA (9.71) (6.76) (3.04) (1.76)
Region .635 .487 .385 .129
North East (17.74) (12.73) (5.76) (3.40)
Region .034 .116 .019 -.031
South (0.77) (2.56) (.25) (.79)
Region .520 .484 .310 .073
West (13.20) (11.23) (4.06) (1.80)
Degrees .018 -.004 -.013 .002
(1.42) (0.32) (.56) (.20)
31Table 3 Continued
Variable LV89 LV89 LV89 LV89 LV89 LV89
Variables Hedonic Augmented Hedonic Reduced Form Structural Form
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
Own -1.574 .271 -.235 -.560
(.56) (2.90) (1.75) (.08)
Own2 .295 .904 2.431 .244
(.38) (.45) (.23) (.14)
Own3 -.011 -.079 .026 -.281
(.15) (.46) (.11) (.19)
Race -.392 .028 -.039 -.006
Head White=1 (2.41) (.66) (.58) (.17)
Race 2 .386 .0001 .0002 .0000
(4.56) (2.11) (1.44) (.79)
Race3 -.063 -.0000 -.0000 -.0000
Head White (5.58) (2.83) (1.66) (.92)
Change in -.108 -.093 -.015
Race89;85 (2.29) (1.28) (.37)
Vacant .310 -.045 .760 .052
( .92) (.12) (1.30) (.15)
Vacant2 -.838 -.014 -.175 -.012
(1.45) (.16) (1.43) (.17)
Vacant3 .331 .002 .023 .001
(1.43) (.15) (1.37) (.08)
Change in .010 .009 .008
Vacant89;85 (.72) (.43) (.62)
32Table 3 Continued
Columns 3 and 5 report coeﬃcients of neighbors’ average values for regressions in Columns 2 and
4, respectively.
Variable LV89 LV89 LV89 LV89 LV89
Variables Hedonic Augmented Hedonic Reduced Form Structural Form
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
Dwelling Unit Data — Q Variables ¯ Q Variables Dwelling Unit Data — Q Variables
Age -.001 -.092 .153 -.088 .058 -.030
(.40) (2.63) (3.64) (3.34) (1.24) (1.54)
Not detached -.252 .141 -.449 .156 -.340 -.018
(4.67) (1.30) (3.63) (1.90) (2.87) (.32)
Unit area .0002 .0001 .0001 .0001 .00001 .0000
(11.75) (4.52) (4.33) (4.23) (1.53) (2.76)
Rooms .062 .369 -.092 .043 -.047 .036
(6.94) (3.74) (5.19) (5.12) (1.92) (4.29)
Baths .176 .088 .222 .056 .077 .035
(8.25) (3.58) (5.05) (2.78) (1.22) (1.68)
Additions .043 .049 .170 .033 .103 .025
(3.05) (3.28) (5.04) (2.45) (2.19) (1.84)
33Table 3 Continued
Columns 3 and 5 report coeﬃcients of neighbors’ average values for regressions in Columns 2 and
4, respectively.
Variable LV89 LV89 LV89 LV89 LV89 LV89
Variables Hedonic Augmented Hedonic Reduced Form Structural Form
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
Household Data — Z Variables ¯ Z Variables Household Data — Z Variables
Moved in .0026 -.208 -.006 -.246 .019
since 1985 (.08) (2.82) (.20) (2.37) (.62)
Age .465 -2.28 .713 -1.46 .772
(.46) (1.07) (.83 ) (.50) (.87)
Age 2 -.047 .313 .85 .189 -.094
(.37) (1.15) (.77) (.51) (.82)
Head White -.062 -.049 -.075 -.067 -.062
(.95) (.29) (1.33) (.32) (1.07)
Education .016 .029 .001 .001 .008
(3.42) (3.45) (2.50) (.11) (1.91)
HH Size -.002 .032 -.008 -.010 -.004
(.20) (1.38) (.89 ) (.32) (.42)
Head married .055 -.113 .058 -.054 .055
(1.58) (1.51) (1.91) (.52) (1.75)
Head male -.077 -.038 -.084 -.137 -.066
(2.20) (.51) (2.70 ) (1.33) (2.08)
Cars .021 .153 .004 .096 -.006
(1.40) (4.43) (.27 ) (1.91) (.42)
Income .045 .146 .031 .074 .020
(3.72) (5.61) (2.89) (2.02) (1.80)
34Table 4:
Alternative Estimates of the Social Interaction Parameter ¯
1 2 3 4 5 6
Property Valuations
Model Mean Field Circular Interaction Reduced Form Structural Form
¹ .161
(8.55)
¯ .683 .618 .769 .671





Implied ˆ ¯ .587
35APPENDIX A: Deﬁnition of Variables and Descriptive Statistics
The ﬁrst group of regressors pertain to cluster-speciﬁc information. These are the Xt variables
in the discussion of the model. They are deﬁned as follows. CC-SMSA denotes whether observa-
tion belongs to a central city of a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. Suburb-SMSA denotes
whether observations belongs to a suburb of a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. The vari-
ables Region-NE, Region-S, and Region-W denote whether observation belongs, respectively, to
the Northeastern, Southern or the Western regions of the US, as deﬁned by the US Bureau of the
Census. Degrees measures heating degree day indicates an additional geographical detail. Own is
the logarithm of the average rate of ownership in the neighborhood cluster. Similarly, Head White
is the logarithm of average number of owners in the cluster, and Vacant is the logarithm of average
vacancy rate in the cluster.
The second group of regressors pertain to dwelling unit characteristics. These are the Qt
variables in the discussion of the model. Age is the age of the dwelling unit in years. Not detached
is a dummy variable indicating whether a unit is not detached. Unit area is the square footage of
the dwelling unit. Rooms the number of its rooms, and Baths that of its bathrooms. Additions is
a dummy variable indicating that the owner has performed renovations that have added to the size
of the unit.
The third group of observations are the characteristics of the household that owns the dwelling
unit, and its head, if appropriate. These are the Zt variables in the discussion of the model. Moved
since 1985 is a dummy variable indicating whether the household observed has moved into the
dwelling unit since 1985. Age is the head’s age in years, Head White is dummy variable indicating
whether the household head is White. Education is the head’s schooling in years. HH Size is the
size of the household. Head Married is a dummy variable indicating whether the household head
is married and Head Male whether it is male. Cars is a dummy variable indicating whether the
household owns cars and is intended to measure wealth. Income is the logarithm of the household’s
total income.
The table that follows reports all individual variables in levels and key variables in logarithms,
as well.
36Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Additions,Log 1989 2183 .500 .802 0 5
Age of Head 1989 2183 54.1 15.6 18 91
Age of dwelling 1989 2183 33.8 18.7 0 75
Baths 1989 2183 1.6 .69 0 5
Cars 1989 2183 1.6 .88 0 7
Central city of MSA 1989 2183 .36 .48 0 1
Degrees, 1989 (categorical,1–6) 2183 3.2 1.4 1 6
Dwelling not detached, 1989 2183 .96 .20 0 1
Education of Head, years 2183 13.3 3.4 0 18
Head Male, =1, if yes 2183 .76 .43 0 1
Head Married, =1, if yes 2183 .69 .46 0 1
37Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Head White =1, if yes 2942 .892 .310 0 1
% White Heads (Race) in cluster 2183 88.51 25.71 0 100
∆L Race89;85 2183 -.03 .28 -2.47 3.15
%Owners in cluster 2183 84.92 17.56 14.29 100
Change in log % Owners 89-85 2183 .008 .140 -.81 1.25
Income, 1989 2183 43333 31487 0 205000
Income, log, 1989 2183 10.33 1.14 0 12.23
Moved since last year, 1989 2183 .069 .254 0 1
Number of rooms, 1989 2183 6.54 1.66 3 14
Number of vacant units in cluster 2183 .29 .90 0 5.88
Other urban, in MSA, 1989 2183 .12 .33 0 1
Persons in household 2183 2.77 1.45 1 11
Region Midwest 2183 .25 .43 0 1
Region Northeast 2183 .20 .40 0 1
Region South 2183 .32 .47 0 1
Region West 2183 .23 .42 0 1
Suburb of MSA, 1989 2183 .53 .50 0 1
Unit area, sf, 1989 2183 1959.2 839.3 152 4000
Value, 1985 $ 2183 84702.7 53395.0 0 250001
Units Vacant 2183 .30 .90 0 5
∆Log Vacantt;t¡1 2183 .33 .93 -1.94 4.80
Value, log, 1985 2183 11.13 .79 0 12.43
Value, 1989 $ 2183 111271.2 82533.2 1000 350000
Value, log, 1989 2183 11.35 .78 6.91 12.77
Value, log, predicted of neighbors, 1989 2179 11.35 .69 8.29 12.77
38